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–   Do asset prices reﬂ  ect  macroeconomic  developments 
(arrow F), in which case they can at the very least serve 
as informative variables ?
–   Is it possible that asset prices are subject to their own 
dynamics, or even ﬁ  nancial “bubbles” ?
–   To what extent do the monetary authorities have con-
trol over movements in asset prices – and therefore 
carry responsibility for them (arrow D) ?
–   Finally, what is the effect of asset price ﬂ  uctuations on 
macroeconomic developments (arrow E) ?
The ﬁ   rst three questions concern the determinants of 
asset price ﬂ  uctuations, whereas the fourth concerns their 
implications. After exploring these causes and effects we 
shall be able to address the question of the appropriate 
response by monetary policy.
1.1   Causes of asset price ﬂ  uctuations
Since the speciﬁ  c characteristic of assets is their durability, 
their prices correspond to the discounted value of income 
or service ﬂ   ows expected in the future, and therefore 
depend on the subjective expectations of the economic 
agents. The subjective element, inseparable from any 
assessment of future prospects, may be based on an 
examination of the long-term fundamental determinants, 
but it may also leave scope for excess optimism or pes-
simism and overheating, known as “bubbles” because of 
the way prices are ﬁ  rst inﬂ  ated before “bursting”. These 
excessive movements are sustained by market players 
whose price expectations are extrapolative, and who hope 
to make a speedy proﬁ  t. However, it is extremely difﬁ  cult, 
especially in real time, to distinguish between the devel-
opment of a bubble and a “justiﬁ  ed” price rise.
Thus, in the case of shares, the factors determining prices 
are the expected movement in dividends, the return 
obtained on a risk-free asset, and the assessment of the 
risk entailed in holding shares, according to the Gordon 









where :  P0 is the current share price  ; Dt
e corresponds 
to the dividend expected for time t ;  r equals the nomi-
nal return on a risk-free asset, which is assumed to be 
constant ;  σ is the risk premium, which is assumed to 
be constant.
Assuming that the expected dividend growth rate g is 
constant, this gives us :
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in which D0 represents the last dividend paid.
However, the expected dividend growth rate g and the 
risk premium σ are subjective elements and cannot be 
observed directly. The rate of return on “risk-free” assets 
r can be observed on the government bond market, 
although excess optimism or pessimism may also occur 
here, leading to some volatility in r.
Clearly, share prices are inﬂ  uenced by the economic out-
look, which they may also help to shape, as we shall see. 
They therefore contain useful information in that respect, 
but its reliability is far from certain  : the American econo-
mist Samuelson once remarked that “Wall Street indices 
predicted nine out of the last ﬁ  ve recessions”. Since the 
level of economic activity, i.e. the degree of pressure on 
the productive capacities of the economy in the broad 
sense, inﬂ  uences price movements, stock market indices 
may also provide useful information for assessing inﬂ  ation 
risks. However, they generally have a negative correlation 
with inﬂ  ationary expectations. In principle, shares  –  which 
are property rights on real assets  –  should immunise their 
holders against inﬂ  ation, which is considered to inﬂ  uence 
g and r in the same way. However, inﬂ  ation, especially if it 
is caused by supply shocks (higher costs), and the disinﬂ  a-
tion which is expected to follow are generally harmful to 
corporate proﬁ  tability.
As in other areas, the inﬂ  uence of monetary policy over 
share prices depends very much on the credibility of the 
central bank. Thus, a monetary policy easing in the form 
of a cut in short-term interest rates will generally tend 
to bolster share prices  : in the ﬁ  rst place, it will stimulate 
economic activity for a while, exerting a positive effect on 
expected dividend growth ; secondly, it may pull long-term 
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interest rates down as well, reducing the opportunity cost 
of holding shares and therefore the rate of discounting 
future dividends  ; thirdly, it lowers the cost of ﬁ  nancing 
short-term equity investments. Conversely, however, an 
easing which is interpreted as inﬂ  ationary will push up 
long-term interest rates and drive down share prices.
The credibility generally enjoyed by central banks today 
has prompted observers to reconsider the link between 
monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability. While it is still generally 
admitted that monetary instability may cause ﬁ  nancial 
instability (since inﬂ   ation leads to an inefﬁ  cient  alloca-
tion of resources, and disinﬂ  ation – or even deﬂ  ation  – 
increases the real weight of the debt and may cause a 
contraction of activity and ﬁ  nancial  tension),  monetary 
stability still does not preclude marked increases in asset 
prices followed by sudden falls and ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties. 
Borio and Lowe (2002) see various reasons for this :
–   favourable supply side developments (increased pro-
ductivity) may simultaneously exert downward pressure 
on product prices and upward pressure on asset prices, 
or even trigger a boom (as in the case of the “new 
economy”) ;
–   the central bank’s credibility anchors price expectations 
and makes them more rigid, moderating at least for a 
time the inﬂ  ationary pressure which is normally gener-
ated by excessive expansion of demand ;
–   the very success of monetary policy may create excess 
optimism ;
–   by eliminating the need to tighten monetary policy, 
such conditions allow the imbalances to continue accu-
mulating.
In the case of property, the factors which operate are 
similar to those determining share prices. Thus, the price 
of a house may be viewed as representing the discounted 
value of future rents. Like share prices, property prices 
are inﬂ  uenced by the rate of economic growth, owing 
to its effect on households’ disposable income, and by 
long-term interest rates. However, the housing market 
differs from the stock market in that it relates to assets 
which provide services to households, and is less liquid. 
Apart from households’ disposable income and interest 
rates, many variables determine prices, such as demo-
graphic developments, the availability of credit, taxes and 
subsidies, and supply factors (town and country planning, 
building costs, etc.)  (1).
Monetary policy inﬂ  uences house prices via its impact on 
economic growth, and hence on households’ income, 
and by its effect on mortgage interest rates, which is 
more direct if those rates are variable. In contrast to what 
happens with shares, inﬂ  ation generally pushes up house 
prices, since property is seen as a safe haven protecting 
against monetary erosion. The probability that an easing 
of monetary policy may cause a price increase is therefore 
higher than in the case of shares. On the other hand, the 
stability of the general price level does not prevent the 
occurrence of steep increases in property prices. Indeed, 
it is relatively common for such price increases to follow a 
rise in share prices.
1.2   Inﬂ  uence of asset price ﬂ  uctuations on 
macroeconomic developments
An asset price increase may stimulate aggregate demand 
for goods and services via three main channels : it increases 
demand for new assets (“Tobin’s  q”)  ; it exerts wealth 
effects on consumption  ; it facilitates credit (“ﬁ  nancial 
accelerator”).
First, the increase in the price of existing assets boosts 
demand for new assets  : ﬁ  xed capital formation by com-
panies and housing construction. In the case of shares, 
Tobin (1969) formulated a theory which states that net 
corporate investment depends on the market value of the 
capital compared to its replacement cost  (2) :
q =  stock market value of the existing capital
replacement cost of the existing capital
The acquisition of an additional unit of capital is proﬁ  table 
so long as its marginal productivity (stock market value, 
which is equivalent to the discounted value of future 
dividends) exceeds its marginal cost (replacement cost). 
Thus, a ﬁ  rm with a q ratio higher than 1  will issue shares 
to ﬁ  nance its new investments until that ratio is equal to 
unity. The explanatory power of Tobin’s theory remains 
subject to debate. The theory is perhaps more relevant in 
economies where it is more common practice to ﬁ  nance 
companies by issuing quoted shares (United States).
In the case of property, rising prices on the second-hand 
market generate demand for new housing  : an increase 
in prices in relation to replacement costs (increase in “q”) 
will make it more attractive to build new houses. The 
increased investment in new housing will exert a positive 
impact on aggregate demand and stimulate growth.
(1)  See ECB (2003) and Baugnet, Cornille and Druant (2003).
(2)  In its basic form, Tobin’s model contains only one private sector and two assets : 
the money issued by the government to ﬁ  nance its deﬁ  cits, and tangible capital. 
In that context, monetary policy is non-existent as the money supply is equal to 
the public debt. Finally, in this simpliﬁ  ed world, the q ratio could to some extent 
be interpreted as the ratio between the ﬁ  rm’s stock market value and its net 
accounting value (liabilities minus assets payable).68
Secondly, the rise in the value of their assets encour-
ages households to step up their consumption. Current 
  consumption is not only a function of current income but 
is also inﬂ  uenced by future income  (1). The latter depends 
on households’ overall wealth, which therefore also inﬂ  u-
ences their consumption behaviour  (2).
The effect on consumption of an increase in share prices 
depends partly on the holding of quoted shares by 
households – a practice which is more widespread in 
the United States than in Europe – and on whether the 
increase is seen as permanent.
Households generally hold the major part of their wealth 
in the form of property. The ultimate effect of a rise in 
house prices on their consumption will depend on the 
underlying factor. In contrast to other assets, houses 
have a use value and provide a service for households. 
If the price increase is due to an upward valuation of 
that service – e.g. because of demographic pressure or 
an increase in rents (and imputed rents) – it will make 
households richer, but will also increase the cost of 
  consuming the services provided by the housing. Potential 
buyers and tenants therefore have to save more, hence a 
decline in their current consumption. For the owners, it is 
generally considered that the positive wealth effect entail-
ing an increase in consumption, outweighs the negative 
income effect (of higher imputed rents). However, even 
if the net wealth effect is zero for the economy as a 
whole, the redistribution of income resulting from the 
rise in property prices could inﬂ  uence aggregate demand 
if the consumption proﬁ  le of the losers differs from that 
of the winners. On the other hand, if the rise in house 
prices is due to a fall in interest rates which persists for 
some time and is not corresponding to slower growth 
expectations, a positive net wealth effect becomes more 
likely. Consumption will actually tend to rise, since the 
gains made by the owners are not negated by the losses 
incurred by the potential buyers. It is therefore essential 
to identify the origin of the economic shock underlying 
property price ﬂ  uctuations in order to make an adequate 
assessment of their impact on aggregate demand.
Finally, the rise in asset prices may exert a positive effect 
on demand via the credit channel. On the credit market, 
information is in fact asymmetric. In view of the existence 
of moral hazard and adverse selection, banks demand 
guarantees to protect themselves against the risk that the 
borrower will not repay the loan granted. The rise in asset 
prices affects those guarantees, attenuates the problem 
of asymmetric information and therefore makes it easier 
to arrange credit.
Thus, the value of the guarantees that a company can 
offer increases as share prices rise, reducing the impor-
tance of the adverse selection problem. At the same 
time, a rise in the company’s market value also makes 
the moral hazard problem less acute – the owners have 
less incentive to embark on riskier projects since their 
potential losses, which are conﬁ  ned to the value of the 
shares which they own in the company, are also higher. 
The rise in share prices will therefore encourage ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to grant credit more readily and thus ﬁ  nance 
additional investment.
A rise in house prices has a similar effect. It increases 
the value of the guarantees that individuals are able to 
provide for lenders, making access to credit easier. The 
expansion of credit may in turn fuel further price rises 
on the housing market or bolster consumption. The 
scale of the impact on consumption will depend on the 
ease of obtaining liquidity following the upward valu-
ation of property (“house equity withdrawal”), which 
in turn depends on the structural characteristics of the 
mortgage market (transaction costs, loan-to-value ratio, 
degree of competition). For the banks, a rise in prices on 
the housing market reduces the risk of default on the 
part of borrowers. Since they incur lower losses on non-
repaid loans, the banks are able to extend more credit 
without any change in their capital, which may also 
encourage investment.
The stimulation of aggregate demand by an increase in 
asset prices may exert inﬂ   ationary pressure. As already 
mentioned, however, this can be contained and the 
danger may lie more in possible deﬂ  ation once a ﬁ  nancial 
bubble bursts. In particular, a sudden asset depreciation 
triggers the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect : a decline in asset 
prices makes the banks far more cautious in their lending. 
The contraction of credit and activity may be even sharper 
in the case of a ﬁ  nancial crisis characterised by the failure 
of major institutions.
(1)  Modigliani’s life cycle theory links consumption to income calculated over a 
consumer’s entire life. Since that income varies during life, households will 
smooth their consumption by saving while at work and dissaving after retirement. 
Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis considers that income is subject to 
random and temporary variations. Friedman breaks down consumers’ income 
into two elements : permanent income and transitory income. Consumers expect 
to maintain the ﬁ  rst (a kind of average income) whereas the second is seen as 
temporary (as a deviation from the average).
(2) See  Eugène,  Jeanﬁ  ls and Robert (2003) for an analysis of the Belgian situation.69
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1.3   How should asset prices be taken into account 
in the conduct of monetary policy ?
Should monetary policy react to sharp ﬂ  uctuations  in 
asset prices ? It seems obvious that the monetary authori-
ties have to take account of the informative value of such 
ﬂ  uctuations in the pursuit of their macroeconomic objec-
tives. Thus, at the very least they must respond to a rise 
in asset prices to the extent that the rise is an advance 
indicator of the business cycle and of future inﬂ  ationary 
pressure  –  a yardstick which is difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  ne !  –  and 
react to a crash in proportion to its impact on activity and 
prices.
Is it necessary to make a speciﬁ  c response to an increase 
in asset prices extending beyond its inherent inﬂ  ation 
risk ? That question is more controversial. In fact, if the risk 
lies not in inﬂ  ation but in the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances which could lead to a ﬁ  nancial crisis, or even 
subsequent deﬂ  ation, then in the short term there could 
be a conﬂ  ict between the price stability and growth stabi-
lisation objectives and the aim of ﬁ  nancial stability.
In practice, the central banks are alert in varying degrees 
to the medium- and long-term risks resulting from the 
accumulation of ﬁ  nancial imbalances. In order to weigh 
up the pros and cons of preventive action in a period of 
rising asset prices without inﬂ  ationary pressure, one might 
start with the optimal conditions for such action and see 
that, in many cases, a strong dose of judgment is needed 
on account of the uncertainty.
The ﬁ  rst point to check is whether the rise in asset prices 
is “excessive” ; that is no easy task as it is normal for such 
prices, which incorporate future income prospects, to 
ﬂ  uctuate considerably. The nature of the shocks driving 
up these prices is important  : a permanent rise in pro-
ductivity calls for less response than speculative euphoria 
(a “bubble”). Supporters of market efﬁ  ciency reject the 
idea of a “bubble” and consider that the central bank 
does not have better information for estimating an 
“equilibrium value” than the many market operators. 
The central bank therefore should not concern itself with 
the setting of these particular prices, but only with the 
general (consumer) price level. Others, however, take 
the view that a combination of indicators sometimes 
permits a fairly certain diagnosis of an excessive increase, 
and – above all – points to the risk of a ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
If asset prices display a signiﬁ   cant and growing devia-
tion from their trend, and there is a simultaneous strong 
expansion of credit, that would be a fairly reliable indica-
tor here.
When a bubble is forming, it is still necessary to predict 
how it will develop  : will it burst before long, in which 
case a tightening of monetary policy would be contra-
indicated, or is it liable to get larger before bursting ?
The costs entailed when the bubble bursts are another 
reason to act. An abrupt downturn in asset prices is 
generally followed by a signiﬁ  cant slackening of growth 
(often accompanied by a bank crisis). In this connection, 
the analysis by Detken and Smets (2004) shows that 
property market bubbles, which quite often follow stock 
market bubbles, appear to be the most damaging.
Will action by the central bank be effective  ? The bubble 
could be encouraged by a too accommodating monetary 
policy, causing credit expansion and a rise in asset prices 
even before inﬂ  ationary pressure becomes apparent. In 
that case, a tightening of monetary policy may stop that 
source of increases. Nonetheless, the impact of a tighten-
ing is uncertain and depends on psychological factors. 
Sometimes, large interest rate hikes would be needed 
to stop the bubble, in others the tightening may cause 
a slump in asset prices. The scale of the monetary policy 
tightening required determines the cost of the action in 
terms of the short-term restraint on activity or a level of 
inﬂ  ation which is below the target.
Finally, one important argument in favour of some 
response to rising asset prices is that it restores symmetry. 
The economic agents expect the central bank to compen-
sate for the effects of an asset price fall, therefore attenu-
ating it. This perceived safety net creates a moral hazard 
problem, which may encourage the formation of bubbles. 
If the central bank responds symmetrically to excessive 
variations in asset prices, it limits the risk of having to 
intervene when the correction takes place and thus of 
encouraging the creation of new imbalances.
The conduct of monetary policy can therefore be seen 
as a form of risk management, over a longer or shorter 
period. Naturally, the ideal conditions for action aimed at 
preventing the formation or ampliﬁ  cation of a ﬁ  nancial 
bubble when hardly any inﬂ  ationary pressure is present 
are never fulﬁ   lled. It is therefore seldom that decisive 
action is taken for this purpose alone, given its immediate 
cost and its uncertain beneﬁ  ts. On the other hand, the 
monetary authorities generally take account of asset price 
movements to a limited extent in their deliberations, and 
may intervene verbally.70
2.   Share prices in the United States and 
in the euro area
In the past twenty years, share prices have ﬂ  uctu-
ated widely, both in the United States and in the euro 
area. These movements were fairly similar owing to the 
increased ﬁ  nancial market integration.
Following a sharp fall in late 1987  (1), share prices gradually 
made good their losses so that, by the end of 1989, they 
had returned to the levels prevailing before the “Black 
Monday” crash. In the early 1990s, the slowdown in 
economic activity once again caused share prices to fall  ; 
though the fall was less sudden, it was more protracted, 
especially in the euro area. While share prices subse-
quently regained momentum, the increases achieved 
between February 1991  and December 1994  were 
modest overall, while exhibiting greater volatility on 
the Old Continent, with annual growth averaging, in 
real terms, 3.2 p.c. in the United States and 3.9 p.c. 
in the euro area. From the mid 1990s, there was a fun-
damental change in the underlying trend and – apart 
from a weakening caused by the problems with LTCM  (2) 
against the background of the ﬁ  nancial crisis in Russia 
during the second half of 1998 – this marked the 
start of one of the longest expansion periods ever seen 
on the stock markets. Between December 1994 and 
August 2000, the S&P 500 index recorded sustained 
growth during which share prices almost tripled in real 
terms, representing an annual increase of almost 20 p.c. 
over a period of just under six years. In the euro area, 
prices began their climb from a lower level and slightly 
later, in March 1995, while they peaked slightly earlier in 
March 2000, so that the DJ Euro Stoxx index increased 
by almost 28 p.c. per annum over those ﬁ  ve years. The 
exuberance was gradually dampened by proﬁ  ts warnings, 
initially originating mainly from companies in the informa-
tion and communication technology sector, in anticipation 
of a downturn in economic activity. As so often happens, 
this was followed by a sudden collapse in prices which 
some refer to as the bursting of the ﬁ  nancial bubble. At 
the beginning of 2003, share prices on both sides of the 
Atlantic had reverted in real terms to the levels prevail-
ing at the end of 1996. Nonetheless, after bottoming 
out in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2003, prices once again began 
rising rapidly until early 2004, recording growth rates of 
around 35 p.c. per annum on both sides of the Atlantic.  However, following this rebound prices stabilised in the 
United States, whereas between February 2004  and June 
2005  they increased at a moderate annual rate of around 
7 p.c. in the euro area. The Federal Reserve’s progressive 
withdrawal of the monetary stimulus in the United States 
and the still wavering economy in the euro area probably 
contributed to this slowing of the rate of increase in share 
prices.
(1)  On 19 October 1987, known as “Black Monday”, the S&P 500 index lost just 
over 20 p.c. of its value, the biggest fall ever recorded in a single trading day.
(2)  LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management) was regarded as one of the most 
important “hedge funds” in the United States. The problems arose because of 
a gamble that went wrong. Noticing an “abnormally” large spread between the 
prices of US Treasury bonds and corporate bonds, the fund took massive bear 
positions on this spread. However, the collapse of the ﬁ  nancial system in Russia in 















































































































































CHART 1  SHARE PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN 
THE EURO AREA
Sources : Shiller (2000), Bisciari, Durré and Nyssens (2003), Datastream.
(1)  Data deflated by the consumer price index.
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DJ Euro Stoxx
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Average 1871-2004 = 14.8 (S&P 500) 
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Average 1973-2004 = 13.7 (euro area)
REAL STOCK MARKET PRICES (1) OF SHARES
(monthly data, indices January 1987 = In(100))
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Did the steep rise in share prices during the second half of 
the 1990s represent the formation of a ﬁ  nancial bubble ? 
If so, has the bubble collapsed altogether or are shares 
still overvalued today  ? There is no unequivocal answer 
to those questions, as is evident from the analysis of the 
movement in the prices themselves, the prices in relation 
to other variables (ﬁ  nancial ratios) and the combination of 
prices and credit aggregates.
Not all sustained price increases necessarily constitute 
a bubble, deﬁ  ned as a rise based on the expectation of 
even higher prices tomorrow, whereas the fundamental 
variables do not seem to justify such increases. As already 
stated, bubbles are difﬁ  cult to identify, either ex ante or 
even ex post. It often happens that favourable develop-
ments in the fundamental factors – such as productivity 
gains, especially if they are regarded as permanent, or 
interest rates which are expected to remain persist-
ently lower – lead to excessive optimism among market 
players, generating euphoria on the stock markets. The 
question then is to what extent rational and irrational 
factors are both involved. Ex post, not every sharp rise 
is necessarily followed by a lasting price correction. In 
particular, in contrast to the market corrections which fol-
lowed the peaks of September 1929  and February 1937, 
the 1956 price fall and the 1987 crash did not produce 
long-lived corrections, so that it is questionable whether 
they actually represented the bursting of a speculative 
bubble.
An approach frequently adopted in practice to assess the 
overvaluation or undervaluation of shares makes use of 
ﬁ   nancial ratios, such as the price/dividend ratio or the 
price/earnings ratio  (1). The latter, which is most commonly 
used, can be incorporated as follows in the Gordon and 




r + σ – g
1 + g D0 
E0
 (3)
in which E0 represents the last earnings ﬁ  gure.
These ratios are in fact very useful for two reasons  : for 
one thing, they link the movements in share prices to 
fundamental variables  ; also, they exhibit a tendency 
to return to the average over varying periods of time. 
An extreme value for a ratio therefore suggests that either 
the numerator or the denominator, or both, should be 
adjusted to restore the ratio to levels closer to its historical 
average. Nonetheless, the capacity of the ratios to predict 
future movements in share prices is highly uncertain.
For instance, the historical average of the price/earnings 
ratio relating to the S&P 500 index, calculated over the 
period from January 1871 to December 2004, is about 
15. That ﬁ   gure is generally taken as the benchmark, 
indicating that the share is neither too expensive nor too 
cheap  (2). In September 1929  and August 1987, when the 
price/earnings ratio stood at 20.2 and 21.4 respectively, 
it “correctly” indicated that shares were overvalued, thus 
predicting a fall in prices. The same applied in August 
2000, when the price/earnings ratio was 28, although it 
had fallen below the record for that period (34 in April 
1999). In contrast, in February 1937, just before a sharp 
price correction (the gains of the ﬁ  ve years preceding the 
peak being totally wiped out over the ensuing ﬁ  ve years), 
the price/earnings ratio was only a little higher than the 
benchmark ﬁ   gure, at 16.8. When the S&P  500 index 
peaked in July 1956 ahead of an admittedly modest 
share price correction, the ratio had stood slightly below 
its historical average, namely at 13.7. Furthermore, there 
have also been “false alarms”, e.g. in December 1921 
(25.2), July 1933 (26.3), March 1992 (25.1) or March 
2002 (46.2). In the ﬁ  rst place, these steep increases were 
due to a sharp, temporary fall in earnings. In conclu-
sion, while this ratio probably provides an indication of 
whether share prices are over- or undervalued, it signals 
the possibility of a correction rather than its exact timing. 
An extreme value is not an automatic predictor of a col-
lapse in prices.
The use of the ﬁ   nancial ratios for prediction purposes 
presupposes that they continue to ﬂ  uctuate  within  a 
relatively stable range, without remaining at extreme 
levels for extended periods. Up to the mid 1990s, the 
price/earnings ratio corresponding to the S&P 500 index 
appeared to move within a symmetrical range around 
its historical average. The length and scale of the devia-
tions observed since then are worrying. Although it is not 
impossible that the long-term “equilibrium value” may 
have risen somewhat, as a result of a reduction in the risk 
premium, and although the deviations from that value 
may prove to be fairly persistent, the high levels reached 
by the price/earnings ratio at the beginning of 2000  were 
probably due to a “bubble”.
The data relating to the euro area do not go back so far 
in time. Over the period 1973-2004, price/earnings ratios 
in the euro area and the United States averaged 13.7  and 
17.7  respectively. At the end of the ﬁ  rst half of 2005, the 
(1)  Tobin’s q ratio, already mentioned, can also supply useful information. However, 
no data are available for the euro area. Bisciari, Durré and Nyssens (2003) show 
that Tobin’s q is better at predicting turning points for American shares than the 
price/earnings ratio.
(2)  This value of 15 is also the average for 1926-1997. For this period it corresponds 
to the following average values of the variables in equation (3) (see Wibaut, 
2000) :
 D/E  =  50  p.c.
  r nominal = 5.25 p.c. (r real = 3 p.c.)
  g nominal = 4.2 p.c. (g real = 1.9 p.c.)
  σ = 2.3 p.c.72
ratio was close to that average in Europe and still lightly 
higher across the Atlantic.
Analysis of the expansion of lending can supply useful 
information for detecting the threat of a crisis. The 
  combination of rapid credit expansion and a sustained 
rise in share prices, often accompanied by abnormally 
low spreads between the yields on corporate and govern-
ment bonds, could presage the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances and thus indicate an increased risk not only 
of a fall in share prices but also of a contraction in lend-
ing, followed by a slowdown of economic growth or 
even a recession. This mechanism appears to have been 
a   contributory factor, at least in part, to the economic 
expansion of the late 1980s, which was followed by a 
downturn in business activity in the early 1990s. More 
recently, it was probably a factor in the economic and 
stock market boom of the late 1990s, followed by the 
slump in 2000. According to this argument, if the credit 
revival seen since the beginning of 2003  were to acceler-
ate and be accompanied once again by a prolonged and 
sustained rise in share prices, that would indicate a pos-
sible accumulation of imbalances on the stock market.
3.  House prices in the euro area
In the case of house prices it is also extremely difﬁ  cult to 
identify a bubble before it has burst. A sharp rise in prop-
erty prices is not necessarily synonymous with the devel-
opment of a bubble, especially if the rise is due to a surge 
in demand for housing, fuelled in turn by a favourable 
movement in fundamental factors. In the case of the euro 
area, the identiﬁ  cation of a bubble is further complicated 
by the fact that there are no harmonised national data 
on average property prices. Therefore, any international 
comparison – and hence also the interpretation of the 
weighted average growth rate for the euro area – has 
to be conducted with caution. The time series relating to 
the house price index used for the purposes of this article 
were calculated by the ECB on the basis of national series 
which have been harmonised as far as possible and relate 
to the period 1990-2004  (1).
House prices in the euro area rose at an average rate 
of 7.2 p.c. in 2004, in line with the rises of 6 to 7 p.c. 
recorded since 2000. However, this period of soaring 
house prices followed a period of weak price increases 
averaging 2 p.c. between 1992 and 1998, and may 



















































CHART 2  SHARE PRICES AND CREDIT IN THE EURO AREA
  (annual percentage change)
Sources : Datastream, ECB.
(1)  Loans by credit institutions in the euro area to the euro area private sector.
DJ Euro Stoxx (left-hand scale)
Loans to the private sector  (1) (right-hand scale)
(1)  The residual divergences between the national series mainly concern the housing 
considered (houses and / or apartments, new housing only or all housing taken 














































CHART 3  HOUSE PRICE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO 
AREA
  (annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : EC, OECD, ECB.
(1)  Percentage deviation from the average level for the period 1990-2004.
(2)  Data deflated by the deflator of final private consumption expenditure.
Disposable income/monthly cost of mortgage 
repayments (1) (left-hand scale)
House price
(right-hand scale) House price in real 
terms  (2)73
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Taking account of inﬂ  ation in the euro area, the recent 
rise in property prices (5 p.c. in real terms) is the highest 
for fourteen years. However, estimates based on less har-
monised time series produced by the BIS indicate that the 
rate of increase has remained well below that of the late 
1980s. If history is any guide to the future, there seems 
to be no immediate danger of a sharp fall in the average 
rate of increase of property prices in the euro area. The 
cumulative effect of the increases of the past ﬁ  ve years 
is nonetheless substantial. It is therefore appropriate to 
check to what extent the recent trends could persist in 
the longer term.
In this respect, the ﬁ  rst step is to compare the movement 
in house prices with its main determinants. Since the 
supply of housing is relatively slow to adapt to market 
conditions, that movement will generally be determined 
by the demand for housing. The rest of this section 
  concentrates mainly on the inﬂ   uence of disposable 
income and mortgage interest rates. If a rise in house 
prices is due primarily to an increase in disposable income 
and  /  or a fall in mortgage interest rates, the purchase of 
a more expensive house will not take up a larger percen-
tage of the household budget, and an average house will 
therefore still be just as affordable.
A simple yardstick which is often used to assess the 
affordability of housing is the ratio between disposable 
income and the monthly cost of mortgage repayments. 
Between 1991 and 1999, this rough indicator of afford-
ability increased sharply, following the modest rise in 
house prices and the decline in mortgage interest rates. 
Since 2000, although house prices have risen much faster 
than in the 1990s, the continuing decline in mortgage 
interest rates has largely offset the negative impact on 
affordability. As a result, over the past ﬁ  ve years, afford-
ability has hovered around a level which is still well above 
the average for the period 1990-2004. There therefore 
appears to be no question of the property market being 
generally overvalued in the euro area.
However, two factors shed a different light on this conclu-
sion. First, the exceptionally low interest rate cannot be 
regarded as permanent, and allowance must be made for 
the risk of a future increase in mortgage interest rates. 
Second, house prices in a number of euro area countries 
have risen much more sharply than the average, so that 
further research is needed on the possible overvaluation 
of the housing market in those countries. Both these 
points will now be examined in more detail before the 
situation on the Belgian housing market is analysed.
3.1   The risk of an increase in mortgage interest 
rates
Although it is certainly necessary to bear in mind that 
the lower mortgage interest rates, compared to the level 
prevailing in the 1980s, have made housing more afford-
able, this positive effect must not be taken as entirely 
permanent. Only part of the fall in mortgage interest rates 
is structural, namely the part resulting from the increased 
credibility of monetary policy. In addition, a number of 
exceptional factors have helped to bring mortgage inter-
est rates down to their current – historically low – level, 
and this situation is therefore unlikely to persist in the 
years ahead. Once mortgage interest rates start to rise, 
the affordability of an average house will decline fairly 
rapidly, unless the interest rate rise causes the pace of 
house price inﬂ  ation to slow down signiﬁ  cantly.
To illustrate the impact of a gradual rise in mortgage inter-
est rates, we examine a scenario in which rates increase 
from 5 p.c. in 2004 to 7 p.c. in 2008. It is also assumed 
that both house prices and disposable income will con-
tinue to rise at the average rate seen over the past six 
years, namely 6.4 p.c. and 3.7 p.c. respectively. In that 
scenario, by 2006 the affordability of an average house 
would already have fallen to the average level prevailing 
in the period 1990-2004, and by 2008 it would be more 
than 10 p.c. below that average. To avoid such a reduc-
tion in affordability, euro area property prices would need 
to fall by 0.2 p.c. per annum over the next four years.
The impact of a gradual rise in mortgage interest rates 
therefore certainly must not be underestimated. On the 
one hand, heavier mortgage repayments will curb private 
consumption. This direct effect will apply mainly to indi-
viduals who have arranged a variable rate loan and who 
therefore need to set aside a larger proportion of their 
income to pay the interest charges. On the other hand, 
the less buoyant demand for housing will probably mod-
erate the pace of house price rises, and will subsequently 
restrain consumption and investment through the wealth 
effect. However, the scale of this indirect effect for the 
euro area is far more uncertain. Since there are currently 
no clear signs of general overvaluation of the housing 
market, the cooling will probably tend to be gradual. 
Furthermore, empirical studies indicate that, in the large 
euro area countries, the movement in house prices has 
hardly any inﬂ  uence on private consumption  (1).
(1)  See for example Catte et al. (2004).74
3.2   The strong surge in house prices in Spain, 
Ireland and France
In recent years, house price developments have varied 
greatly between countries in the euro area. In 2004, the 
average house in Germany was selling at a lower price than 
in 1998, whereas Spain, Ireland and France, for example, 
have seen annual increases averaging 10 p.c. or more 
in the past six years. Belgium is in an intermediate posi-
tion, with house price rises averaging 6.4  p.c. per annum 
between 1998  and 2004. However, these wide variations 
do not necessarily imply that the housing market in Spain, 
Ireland and France was overvalued in 2004, or that it was 
undervalued in Germany, as they can be attributed in part 
to differences in the fundamental macroeconomic factors. 
Yet it remains questionable whether an annual increase of 
10 p.c. or more is ultimately sustainable.
In the euro area, it is Spain that has seen the sharpest 
rise in house prices in recent years. Although the rate 
of increase did slow down slightly from 17.6 p.c. in 
2003 to 17.3 p.c. in 2004, the trend is still upwards. 
Between 1998 and 2004, house prices in Spain have 
risen by an average of 15.3 p.c. per annum. Part of 
that extremely steep increase can be explained by a 
number of macroeconomic developments. For instance, 
the above-average economic growth contributed to an 
increase in the disposable income of Spanish people, 
causing demand for housing (both ﬁ   rst and second 
homes) to rise more sharply than in most other euro 
area countries. In addition, demand was underpinned 
by the further fall in mortgage interest rates and the 
greater availability of long-term loans. Martínez Pagés 
and Maza (2003) show that the low equity returns in 
recent years have also pushed up house prices. Finally, 
the price of the average house had risen by only 1.5  p.c. 
per annum between 1991  and 1998, so that the current 
price increases may also be seen partly as a catching 
up process. In Ireland, too, house prices have soared in 
recent years, while the growth rate in 2004  was slightly 
below the 2003 level. Although they have risen consid-
erably less fast in the past few years than in the peak 
year of 1998 (when the increase came to 28.6  p.c.), 
the price of an average house in Ireland still increased 
by 13.5 p.c. per annum between 1998 and 2004. The 
strong economic growth and the continuing fall in mort-
gage interest rates played an important role here, too. In 
addition, McQuinn (2004) ﬁ  nds a positive link with the 
high level of immigration and the banks’ greater willing-
ness to grant larger mortgage loans. Finally, in France 
the sharp rise in house prices is more recent. Following 
a substantial increase in 1990, the house price index in 
France hardly rose at all in the ensuing years. It is only 
since 1998  that the pace of growth has gradually picked 
up, reaching 15  p.c. in 2004, the second highest rate in 
the euro area. The strong demand for housing in France 
appears to be due mainly to the robust economic growth 
in the late 1990s and the favourable ﬁ  nancing condi-
tions. Combined with slow growth in the supply of hous-
ing, this strong demand has exerted upward pressure on 
the price of an average home in France.
In Spain and France, the affordability of an average house 
increased signiﬁ  cantly for much of the 1990s. Not only did 
house prices rise more slowly than disposable income, the 
decline in mortgage interest rates also meant that more 
individuals could afford to buy a house than had previ-
ously been the case. However, since 2000 affordability 
has declined in both countries, as a result of the stronger 
rise in house prices. Nonetheless, affordability is currently 
still above the average level for the period 1990-2004. 
In Ireland the situation is somewhat different. There, the 
surge in house prices began earlier, so that the improve-
ment in affordability had already ceased by 1995. After 
that, affordability declined fairly rapidly as a result of the 
sustained rise in house prices, and since 1997 it has hov-
ered within a fairly narrow range around the average level 























































CHART 4  AFFORDABILITY OF HOUSING (1)
  (percentage deviation from the average level for the period 
1990-2004)
Sources : OECD, ECB.
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In each of these three countries, the affordability measure 
of an average house is currently above or close to the aver-
age for the period 1990-2004. The recent movements in 
the house price index in Spain, France and Ireland there-
fore do not appear to be a deﬁ  nite indication of an over-
valued housing market. However, that conclusion is not 
always borne out by more complex empirical assessments. 
Although Bessone, Heitz and Boissinot (2005) deduce that 
the French housing market is not overvalued (as yet), stud-
ies for Spain and Ireland conclude that there are indeed 
risks associated with the recent price increases. In the case 
of Ireland, while most models indicate that the housing 
market is not overvalued, the central bank is nevertheless 
concerned about the substantial rise in the indebtedness of 
individuals, which has accompanied the sharp rise in house 
prices. In the case of Spain, Martínez Pagés and Maza 
(2003) and Ayuso and Restoy (2003) actually ﬁ  nd that the 
price of an average house was already above its equilibrium 
value in 2002. The scale of the overvaluation depends very 
much on the model used, but the deviation is not unusually 
large, in historical terms, in any of the models. Nonetheless, 
the economic impact of any house price correction could 
be signiﬁ  cant. Moreover, an assessment of the risks needs 
to take account of the fact that the mortgage interest rates 
will probably not remain so low in the future. If an increase 
in the mortgage interest rates does not coincide with a suf-
ﬁ  ciently sharp cooling of house prices, the affordability of 
an average house will soon decline.
3.3  House price developments in Belgium
In Belgium, the annual increase in the house price index 
dropped from 7.8 p.c. in 2003 to 6.8 p.c. in 2004. 
Although the rate of increase in 2004 was above the 
average for the preceding ﬁ  ve years, it was still well below 
the peak levels attained in 1976 and 1977. During the 
1970s and 1980s, the Belgian house price index ﬂ  uctu-
ated much more widely than in later years. During the ﬁ  rst 
half of the 1970s, the rate of house price rises in Belgium 
accelerated steadily, culminating in increases averaging 
over 10 p.c., even after adjustment for inﬂ  ation, in the 
period 1976-1978. It was no coincidence that this peak 
followed a period of very high inﬂ  ation. Indeed, the latter 
may have encouraged many individuals at that time to 
invest in property, considered to offer good protection 
against a fall in the value of money. A substantial correc-
tion followed, mainly caused by a sharp rise in mortgage 
interest rates. Since 1990 the annual increase in house 
prices has ﬂ  uctuated between 4 p.c. and 9 p.c.
In the past eighteen years, house prices in Belgium have 
systematically risen faster than the disposable income of 
individuals. One reason may be the strong demand for 
housing following the decline in mortgage interest rates, 
but the scarcity of building land has undoubtedly contrib-
uted to growing demand for existing housing. However, 
the affordability of an average house improved, because 
the increase in the house price was more than offset by the 
substantial fall in mortgage interest rates during the 1990s. 
At the end of the 1990s, an average house was actually 
more affordable than in the 1970s and 1980s, except for 
the years 1986-1988. Since then, affordability has declined 
slightly once again, but in 2004  it was still above the aver-
age for the period 1970-2004. The Belgian housing market 
therefore does not really seem to be overvalued.
A comparison of the movement in rents with that in 
mortgage loan repayments may also provide an indication 
of the possible overvaluation of the housing market in 
Belgium. In the 1970s and 1980s, the ratio between rents 
and repayments displayed quite considerable ﬂ  uctuations, 















































CHART 5  HOUSE PRICE DEVELOPMENTS IN BELGIUM
  (annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : EC, OECD, Stadim, NBB.
(1)  Percentage deviation from the average level for the period 1970-2004.
(2)  Data deflated by the deflator of final private consumption expenditure.
House price
(right-hand scale) House price in real 
terms (2)
Rent/monthly cost of mortgage 
repayments (1)




(1)  Rents generally take quite a time to follow movements on the housing market, 
as the majority of rents in any given year are covered by existing contracts, and 
these are only adjusted in line with the consumer price index. Since it is only the 
rents under new contracts that can be adjusted to the changed situation on the 
housing market, only very sharp increases in those rents will have an impact on 
the overall rents index.76
A sharp fall in this ratio between 1972 and 1980 was 
followed by a substantial correction in the ensuing seven 
years. Since 1990 the ratio between rents and repay-
ments has ﬂ   uctuated within a relatively narrow range, 
although in the past few years it has dropped once again. 
In 2004, it was below the average for the period 1970-
2004, indicating that the current situation is not entirely 
without risk.
Furthermore, the affordability of housing will decline 
rapidly once mortgage interest rates begin to rise, unless 
the rate of increase in the house price index slows sig-
niﬁ  cantly. The impact on private consumption in Belgium 
will probably be small, however. Firstly, there are clear 
limits on the maximum adjustment to interest rates on 
variable rate mortgage loans, so that the increase in the 
interest burden for individuals will probably tend to be 
small. Secondly, Eugène, Jeanﬁ  ls and Robert (2003) found 
no indications of any signiﬁ  cant wealth effect of house 
prices in Belgium. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded that 
an increase in mortgage interest rates and a house price 
moderation will have adverse economic consequences.
4.   Asset prices and the monetary policy 
of the Eurosystem
The ECB Governing Council has adopted a monetary 
policy strategy oriented towards the medium term, fea-
turing anticipatory action based on the analysis of all the 
available data in a structured framework. Movements 
in asset prices are therefore closely monitored and they 
play a role in the decision-making process – without, of 
course, being a target in themselves  (1).
The framework for analysing the risks to price stability 
comprises an “economic” and a “monetary” pillar. The 
economic analysis tries to assess the upward and down-
ward pressure exerted on prices in the short and medium 
term by the interaction between supply and demand and 
by the cost developments. The macroeconomic projec-
tions produced at regular intervals for a two-year horizon 
take account of the “normal” effects of the movement in 
asset prices, such as the wealth effects. The risks associ-
ated with any ﬁ  nancial imbalances are harder to incorpo-
rate in the projections, since it is not easy to determine 
their probability and scale.
The monetary analysis serves primarily to assess the risks 
to price stability in the medium and long term. Originally, 
the emphasis was on the growth of M3, as an advance 
indicator of inﬂ  ationary pressure, since during the period 
1980-1998 there was a fairly stable medium-term link 
between M3 and consumer prices in the euro area. 
However, the very rapid monetary expansion between 
2001 and 2003, due mainly to a strong increase in the 
preference for liquidity in a period of uncertainty, did not 
generate inﬂ  ationary pressure. There is no doubt that the 
monetary aggregates are being increasingly inﬂ  uenced by 
portfolio reallocations, and that their impact on activity 
and prices is being felt more via the ﬁ  nancial markets. The 
monetary analysis was therefore extended and reﬁ  ned. 
On the basis of a series of indicators relating to money 
and credit, together with indicators of any overvaluation 
of asset prices, it is possible, in particular, to assess the 
risk that an expansionary monetary policy may lead to an 
accumulation of ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
As regards the recent movements in asset prices, share 
prices in the euro area do not appear to be obviously over-
valued. However, in the United States the price  /  earnings 
ratio still remains high in historical terms, despite the 
downward trend of the past few years, and a possible 
drop in American share prices could affect stock markets 
in the euro area. The ﬂ  uctuations in house prices are gen-
erally less substantial, but could be more damaging. The 
average increase in house prices in the euro area does not 
appear excessive, but there is a considerable difference 
between Germany, where prices are falling, and countries 
such as Spain, France and Ireland where they are rising 
strongly. In these last countries, the price increase can 
be attributed mainly to fundamental factors. However, 
one of those is the low interest rate which, though 
partly structural – since the credibility of the Eurosystem 
renders it unlikely that interest rates will return to the level 
seen in the 1980s and the early 1990s  –  could also be to 
some extent temporary.
The ECB Governing Council therefore has little reason 
to tighten monetary policy solely in order to control any 
ﬁ   nancial bubble, but it remains vigilant as regards the 
consequences for liquidity, credit and asset prices  –  espe-
cially house prices  –  of maintaining interest rates at a low 
level. Since the common monetary policy cannot be used 
to solve national problems, national governments can also 
take measures to counteract domestic house price move-
ments, if they consider them as excessive. For instance, 
the supply of housing can be stimulated or the tax rules 
which encourage demand can be changed.
(1) See  ECB  (2005).77
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